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REVIEWS
THE "WARREN COURT" AND ITS IDEA OF PROGRESS
Arval A. Morris*
TEm SuPREmE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS. By Alexander M.

Bickel. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. xii, 210. $6.50.
I. THE WARREN COURT
Bickel begins his first chapter with the statement that "[l]ike so
many of his predecessors, Earl Warren, fourteenth Chief Justice of the
United States gave his name to a Court."' He then proceeds to discuss
the tradition of attributing the name of the Chief Justice to a Court:
"Article III of the Constitution established 'one supreme court,' . . .
we are prone to speak of many-a Marshall, a Taney, a Taft and a
Hughes Court, even a Chase and Vinson, and certainly a Warren
Court." 2 He notes "that other dates can be more crucial than those of
the Chiefs," and that "[n]o one man puts his exclusive stamp on the
Court;" even so, Bickel concludes, "[t]he practice is, on the whole,
harmless enough, and often it achieves a certain aptness."' Bickel thus
leads his readers to believe that he intends to use the locution, "The
Warren Court," in the traditional way, as a chronological device for
slicing off a part of the Supreme Court's history. However, it soon
becomes evident that a different meaning is intended: "In my usage,
the terms 'Warren Court' and 'Justices of the Warren Court' refer to
the dominant majority that gave the Court its character. That majority
consisted over the years of the Chief Justice and Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan, Goldberg, Fortas, and Marshall."' Although Bickel
qualifies this statement somewhat,' it is clear that basically his "Warren
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. BA. 1951, Colorado College; MA. 1952,
J.D. 1955, Univ. of Colorado; LLM. 1958, Yale Univ.
1. A. BIcx L, Tna SupnEmz CouRT AND = IFA OP PROGRESS 3 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Bic:E].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3-4.
4. Id. at 12 n.t (emphasis supplied).

s. Id.
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Court" consists of only seven justices out of a possible seventeen. Ten
justices, 6 who served with distinction on the Supreme Court between
October, 1953 and October, 1969, and who participated in its more
important decisions, frequently in the majority, are excluded.
Bickel does not define the intended meaning of his term the "dominant majority that gave the Court its character," nor does he describe
criteria that one could apply to the justices to determine who properly
qualifies for membership on this "Warren Court." This is an important
consideration because in subsequent chapters Bickel is highly critical
of the "Warren Court," obviously intending his remarks to apply only
to the seven select justices.' However, if Bickel desires to limit his
"blame" of the Court's work to only seven justices he must advance
arguments that can bear the brunt of reasoning, which is no more than
he himself expects of the "Warren Court." His failure to define the
substantive nature of the "character" given to the Court by its "dominant majority" of seven justices, as distinguished from the "character"
given to the Court by its remaining ten justices is inexcusable in view
of his criticism that the "Warren Court" refused "too often, to submit
to the discipline of the analytically tenable distinction."' Bickel fails
to support, by evidence or sound argument, the validity of his concept
of the "Warren Court." Hence, there are many obstacles that he must
overcome before this limitation would become plausible.
Reviewing the tenure of the seven justices comprising Bickel's "Warren Court," one finds, of course, that only three of them-Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Douglas-served throughout the entire
span of the Warren Court. Justice Brennan joined the Court in 1956;

Of course, the majority was no monolith. There were defections, if that is the right
word, in one or another case-on Justice Black's part, with increasing frequency
toward the end-and the majority would now and then draw to itself a member of
the opposition, if that, again, is the right word, such as Justice Stewart or Justice
White. And in Brown v. Board of Education and a number of other racial cases, the
Court was unanimous.
6. Those excluded are Justices Stanley F. Reed, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson,
Harold H. Burton, Tom C. Clark, Sherman Minton, John M. Harlan, Charles E. Whittaker, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White.
7. For example: "I have dwelt on the Warren Court's refusal, too often, to submit to
the analytically tenable distinction, and I have dwelt on other failings of like character.
The insistence on reason in the judicial process, on analytical coherence, and on principled
judgment no matter how narrow its compass, is traditional." BIcKEL at 81.
8. Id.

588

Reviews
Justice Goldberg joined the Court in 1962; Justice Fortas replaced
Justice Goldberg in 1965 and resigned in May, 1969, and Justice Marshall replaced Justice Clark in 1967. Not only is it impossible, then, to
say that before 1962 there was a "dominant majority," it is equally impossible to say that the "Warren Court," in Bickel's sense of the term,
existed before that date. Thus, his concept can have no plausibility until
after October, 1962, when it first became possible for a majority of the
Supreme Court to consist of five of Bickel's seven justices. But the
year 1962 is well after some cases Bickel considers significantf Furthermore, since Justice Fortas replaced Justice Goldberg, there were never
more than five possible members of Bickel's "dominant majority" of
the "Warren Court" from 1962 until 1967 when Justice Marshall
joined the Court. Thus, there could.be no "Warren Court" before 1962,
and from 1962 until 1967 there could not be a "dominant majority" of
Bickel's "Warren Court" whenever one member disagreed with the
other four. Disagreement occurred frequently. During October Term
1964, Justices Black and Goldberg participated together in 87 cases,
and hence, could have voted together 87 times. But Justices Black and
Goldberg voted together in only 39 cases, leaving 48 cases in which
they disagreed.1 0 Thus, there was no "Warren Court," in Bickel's
sense of the term, in at least 48 cases during the 1964 Term. Thus, I
believe we must reject Bickel's attempt to limit the applicability of his
disappointing criticisms to only a few members of the Court. If Bickel's
faulting of the Warren Court is valid, it applies, at minimum, to the
Court as a whole whenever the Court was unanimous, and otherwise to
its actual, not a mythical, "dominant" majority. Moreover, I believe
dissenting justices share uniquely in the responsibility for the quality of
the work of the Court. If dissents are perceptive, opinions of the Court
that meet those dissents will be that much better. Thus, in my view,
Bickel's criticisms and blame, if valid, must be borne by the Warren
Court, as a whole, and this includes Bickel's favored Justices, of whom
none is more favored than the late Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter.
9. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
10. The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Statistics, Table I B, 79 HAZv. L. REv. 109
(1965).
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II. THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
JUSTICES
Many themes and accusations are confusingly intertwined throughout
Bickel's second chapter, denying the reader an easy basis for understanding them, seeing their interrelationships, and judging each accordingly. At best, this chapter is suggestive of further work.
Bickel sets forth one theme early, quoting with approval Sir Lewis
Namier's paradoxical view of history that people tend to "imagine
the past and remember the future."" Bickel applies this notion to his
"Justices of the Warren Court" saying that they believed "that progress, called history, would validate their course, and that another gen12
eration remembering its own future, would imagine them favorably.'
How would one go about validating this notion, and what, exactly,
would constitute adequate evidence of it?
The title of this chapter is derived from an adaptation of the 1931
Storr's Lectures of Carl L. Becker, "The Heavenly City Of The Eighteenth Century Philosophers."' 3 Becker's thesis about the great rationalist philosophes of the eighteenth century, is that they were not as
"rational," or as "reasonable" or as "faithless" as they, and others,
believed:14

I know it is the custom to call the thirteenth century an age of
faith, and to contrast it with the eighteenth century, which is
thought to be pre-eminently the age of reason ....But ...reason
may be employed to support faith as well as to destroy it ....In a
11. BICKEL at 13. See L. NAMIER, CONFLICTS 70 (1942).
12.

BICKEL at 13-14.

13. C. BECKER, THE HzAVm-LY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHrLOSOPHERS
(1932). But c.f. P. GAY, THE PARTY OF HUmANITY 188-210 (1964). Bickel is aware of
Gay's criticisms of Becker's thesis, but believes that his "own use of it is not vulnerable
to the criticism" because "I portray my philosophes neither as 'naive,' nor as 'a little
fraudulent,' to quote Professor Gay's accusation against Becker." BICKEL at 14 n.*. But,
one page earlier, after asserting that the mentality of his "Warren Court" was to use an
eraser on history in very selective ways, Bickel remarks on one member of his "Warren
Court" thusly: "The cast of mind is perhaps nowhere more saliently, more ingenuously...
exhibited than in a decisive remark of Mr. justice Douglas." BICKEL at 13. Ingenuously
(?) but not naive or a little fraudulent? Actually Bickel is open to several of the criticisms
Gay levelled at Becker; because Bickel overgeneralizes, inferring too much about his seven
"Justices of the Warren Court," and by using highly selected portions of the work of the
Supreme Court, both before and after Bickel's "Warren Court" existed, yet ascribing responsibility for that work to his "Warren Court."
14.

(1932).
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very real sense it may be said of the eighteenth century that it was
an age of faith as well as of reason ....
Bickel holds that Becker's thesis, like Namier's, applies with equal
force to his "Justices of the Warren Court." This leads Bickel to name
the "faith" of his "Warren Court" and to introduce another theme
about the second element in his volume's title, "The Idea of Progress."
By the idea of progress, in the abstract, Bickel means to invoke the
same notion developed by J. B. Bury, 5 that, the idea of progress "belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality
...and like them it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is
an act of faith."'16 Bickel believes that "what informed the enterprise
[his "Warren Court"] was the idea of progress.11 7 Thus, he holds that
his "Justices of the Warren Court" were linked together by an essen-3
tialiy religious faith, which he would call "the Egalitarian Society."'
Bickel continues, "the Justices steered by this goal, as Marshall did by
his vision of a nation, in the belief that progress, called history, would
validate their course, and that another generation, remembering their
own future, would imagine them favorably"1 9
While Bickel names the "faith" of his "Warren Court," and locates
it within the order of ideas, he fails to identify that faith's substantive
content, or present evidence which could justify his making this notion
the cardinal element of his "Warren 'Court's" creed. The term, "Egalitarian Society," is not self-defining and can have many meanings, allowing Bickel considerable leeway, and casting doubt on the validity of his
subsequent assertions about the consequences of holding the "egalitarian faith."
Building on his adaptation of Becker's thesis Bickel elaborates a
third, and novel, theme: that the line of intellectual descent of his "Warren Court" is direct from those prior Justices, such as Rufus W. Peckham and George Sutheriand, who built their economic faith into constitutional law under the rubric of "substantive due process of law."120 As
he pictures it, "we have traveled a long distance from the constitutional
15.
16.
17.
18.
(1970).
19.

3. BURY, TMI IDEA OF PRooanss (1920).
Id. at 4; quoted in BIc= at 19.
Bice=r, at 13.
Id. See Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 McH. L. REV. 629
BIc=EL at 13-14.

20. Id. at 14-23.
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religion of eighty and thirty years ago, but we have traveled in an arc.
On a linear plane we are not so far from where we started. The distance
is from Lochner v. New York ...to the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut ....

,,21
And Bickel concludes that his "Warren Court has traveled

the main highway of the institution's history,"22 by inserting its religious
faith into the constitution under the guise of constitutional interpretation. This is the only citation to Griswold in the book. It is never discussed.2 Bickel cannot properly rely upon one undiscussed case for
adequate support of his theme about the intellectual descent of his
"Warren Court." Although Bickel does not say it flatly, what he really
relies upon for support of his theme is his earlier, unsupported assertion
that the link among his "Justices of the Warren Court" was their essentially religious belief in an idea of progress. For Bickel, a "belief" is a
"belief" is a "belief," even though each may have a quite different
nature. But, what is crucial for him is not only that his "Warren Court,"
like other Courts, had a "faith," but that the Justices of these Courts
were willing to translate their faiths into constitutional law by believing
that realization of their faiths was "progress." Bickel asserts that
"[u]nmistakably the Warren Court considered itself under a special
duty to act when recourse to Congress had failed or was likely to
fail ....,,24 Ultimately, the "Heavenly City of the Twentieth-Century
Justices," against which Bickel inveighs, turns out to be the institution
of judicial review and judicial activism.
Bickel indicts his "Warren Court" for failure to heed the lessons
taught by the American legal realists. Their shortcoming lies in their
additional "faith" that "progress is manmade." Thus, his "Justices of
the Warren Court" were activists and used their powers of judicial
review to build their "faith" into constitutional law. If one adheres to
this belief, Bickel continues, "the discovery of [progress'] proper direction is crucial, and that discovery would at some stage be seen to be
quite as much an act of faith as the optimistic reliance on automatic

21.

Id. at 41.

22.

Id. at 42.

23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), held that a state's anti-contraception
statutes were an unconstitutional invasion of the marital right to privacy.
For a contrasting view of the importance of Griswold see Black, The Unfinished Business
of the Warren Court, 46 WAsr. L. REv.3, 32 (1970).
24. BicxEL at 114.
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progress. 5 (One wonders whether the second part of this statement
constitutes Bickel's "faith"?) Bickel labels his "Justices of the Warren
Court... progressive realists," and states that while his "Justices"
heeded enough of the lore taught by the American legal realists to have
exploded and "brought down the old constitutional faith ... its substance exposed and rejected," they nevertheless failed to follow realist
teaching adequately because "faith as such was not banished; reason
'
was not enthroned in solitary sovereignty."26
Instead, for Bickel's
"Warren Court," "[b]elief in man-made progress was the new faith,
and the supremacy of judges as its carriers and executors was not
27
denied."
Bickel criticizes his "Justices of the Warren Court," as Becker did
his philosophes, because they "'engaged in that nefarious medieval
enterprise of reconciling the facts of human experience with truths already, in some fashion, revealed to them.' I'2 He asserts that "such a
faith [in the idea of progress and the Egalitarian Society] need not
conflict with, but it overrides standards of analytical reason and scientific inquiry as warrantors of the validity of judgment." 9 Thus, to
Bickel, the supreme standards of legal craftsmanship which warrant the
"validity of judgment," and by which the work of his selected "Warren
Court" is to be judged, are the "standards of analytical reason and
scientific inquiry."
However, because Bickel fails adequately to explain these two "standards" we are given no clear or precise idea of the substantive content
of the criteria used to evaluate the work of the "Justices of the Warren
Court." If one judges the opinions of the Supreme Court solely by the
standard of analytical reason-assuming one knows what Bickel
means-legal scholarship can be reduced to mere exercises in logicchopping. (By this, I do not mean to disparage analytical reasoning;
it is necessary, but not sufficient). As a consequence, many of the
political and social results achieved by one of our branches of government, as well as a policy-oriented jurisprudence, would be removed from
legal craftsmanship and legal scholarship. In Bickel's language, these

25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.

27. Id.
28.

Id. at 21, quoting C. Baoxm, supra note 13, at 102.

29. BIc=L at 14.

593

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 587, 1971

would constitute an "idea of progress" and "faith" and, thus, become
illegitimate. Bickel asserts that the justices of the Warren Court directed their legal craftsmanship toward achieving wise social consequences and "relied on events for vindication more than on the
method of reason for contemporary validation."3' Bickel refuses to
meet the "Warren Court" on its own terms, and applies his standard of
analytical reason without regard for the visionary goals of the court.
His criticisms are to be faulted for their failure to acknowledge that the
court's legal craftsmanship can also be evaluated for its effectiveness
in achieving the ends towards which it is directed. Although Bickel is
willing to admit analytical reason as one criterion of judgment, he
fails to discuss the admission of its partner in thought, synthetic
reason.
Furthermore, since he fails to discuss his other "warrantor of judgment," the standard of scientific inquiry, it is difficult to determine
whether Bickel would include the value-oriented social sciences and
allow a policy-oriented jurisprudence, or whether he would exclude
them relying only on the value-free social sciences, 3 ' or indeed, whether
any social science would qualify at all under his standard of scientific
inquiry. Bickel leaves us in the dark on all of this, although in his
final chapter he does argue that the progeny of Brown v. Board of
Education are doomed to failure because of their social consequences.
Bickel is open to another criticism here. Far too frequently he fails
to distinguish clearly between "interpreting an empirical fact or relationship," which presupposes the existence of that fact or relationship,
and "asserting an empirical fact." Bickel makes many assertions of
fact for which he fails to adduce adequate supporting evidence. For
example, he asserts that his "Justices of the Warren Court" had "an
aspiration to a transcendent consistency with a preferred past, a striving for fidelity to a true line of progress."3 2 Here Bickel is asserting an
empirical fact about psychology, the motivating aspirations of his
"Justices of the Warren Court." This may be true or false. The truth
of his assertion about psychological motivation is critical to the way in
which Bickel's "idea of progress" functions in his thought, but Bickel
30. Id. at 12.
31. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, VALrUE iN SociA
32. BIcxKL at 13.
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neither cites nor produces evidence sufficient to satisfy the standards
of the science of psychology. To support his assertion, Bickel relies
upon opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, many of
them authored by justices other than Bickel's "Justices of the Warren
Court." Surely, this latter point as well as the collegial nature of
Supreme Court opinions disqualifies them as sufficient evidence of the
judicial psychology of his selected "Justices of the Warren Court."
If Bickel is seeking to interpret the opinions of the Supreme Court he
might invoke the concept of the "Egalitarian Society" to account for,
or to interpret, them. But how adequately does the concept of the
Egalitarian Society account for the total work of the Court? Does
this synthesizing notion exclude any of the work of the Court? To the
extent that it accounts only for the work of the Court under the equal
protection clause, the concept is trivial because, as the Court decides
cases under the equal protection clause, it necessarily promotes an
"egalitarian society." It is not clear how well the concept accounts for
other cases such as the first amendment speech and association cases
and the two areas of the Court's work excluded by Bickel-criminal
procedure and religion. One is never fully sure whether Bickel uses
his "idea of progress," the "Egalitarian Society," interpretively or
assertively.
Returning to a variation on a previous theme, Bickel approvingly
identifies a different "intellectual line of descent" in the twentiethcentury history of the Supreme Court. This line of intellectual development heeded the teachings of the American legal realists; it is fully
mature, according to Bickel, and it banished faith, enthroning "reason"
in solitary sovereignty. The practitioners of this judicial philosophy
have an accurate and realistic appreciation of the judicial function;
they know their conscious aid unconscious biases, or faiths, and refuse
to enshrine them as constitutional law under the guise of constitutional
interpretation. They know that "constitutional adjudication [is] a
task of statesmanship" 3 and that "[j]udicial statesmanship would then,
for the most part, consist of fidelity to legislative policy. '8 4 For the
"most part?" 5 Naturally, these wise judicial practitioners are "long33. Id. at 23.
34. Id. at 25.
35. This is the Achilles heel of Bickel's position because he wants it both ways; he fails
to identify criteria that would indicate when the Court should intervene. He wants to re-
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headed men" who realistically recognize their biases and judicial limitations, and defer judicial judgment invoking the passive virtues
(vices?) 86 rather than judicial activism, and therefore, do not invoke
judicial review. They can, perhaps, best be described as legal positivists,
rather than legal realists, and for Bickel, they are the direct descendants
of the twin saints of Bickel's Heavenly City, Mr. Justices Holmes and
Brandeis.
Of course, the Justice whom Bickel believes best represents this line
of intellectual development during the Warren years was the late Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, with whom Bickel contrasts his "Justices of the
Warren Court." The "Justices of the Warren Court," judicial activists,
were spurred on by their faith in Egalitarian Society. They did not
defer, nor fairly consider all of constitutional history, but rather
selected their history and used their reason to achieve their ideal of
progress. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter, influenced by his
beliefs that a conscious recognition of the judicial function was the only
way to protect Supreme Court opinions from the abstract formulation
of unconscious bias and that judicial statesmanship consisted mainly of
fidelity to legislative policy,8 7 was led to judicial deference and the
passive virtues (or vices) .88
tain the institution of judicial review; yet, he believes that its use results in "policy made
by judges-undemocratic and often rigid" (Id. at 25), and he counsels that the Supreme
Court should intervene, but not too much. How much is too much is never clearly identified. This view of judicial review held by Bickel and others, such as James Bradley
Thayer, Holmes, Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter, begs the significant questions:
Who, using what criteria, decides when a crisis has arrived which is important enough for
the Supreme Court to intervene; and how is this decision communicated, and in what
way ought a crisis be resolved? If Bickel's answer is "the Justices," then he has no
ground from which to criticize his "Warren Court."
36. Compare Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) and A. BICxEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CAL. L. REv.
1 (1964).
37. Contrary to Bickel's assertions about Professor Frankfurter's belief before he
went on to the Court "that the Due Process Clause should be repealed, or ... restricted to
procedural matters," (BTCEL at 26) after he became Mr. Justice Frankfurter, as my
colleague Professor Cornelius Peck points out, the Justice never restricted the due process
clause to procedural matters and never shrunk from enforcing vague, substantive provisions
of statutes, and if statutes, why not constitutional provisions? Consider, for example,
Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1950):
It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it expressed its mood
not merely by oratory but by legislation. As legislation that mood must be respected,
even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid
rules assuring sameness of application. Enforcement of such broad standards implies
subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is not for us to question that
Congress may assume such qualities in the federal judiciary.
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Thus while Bickel criticizes his "Warren Court," he is unclear about
the basis of his criticisms. He fails to state clearly whether his "Justices
of the Warren Court" were ignorant or blinded to the true nature of the
judicial function by their idea of progress, and that because of this,
they were led into judicial activism, or whether his "Justices of the
Warren Court" were as perceptive as Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and after
perceiving the true nature of the judicial function, consciously and
voluntarily seized the opportunity it afforded them to build toward an
Egalitarian Society, even if it meant a selective reading of history and
a conscious abandonment of "the standards of analytical reason and
scientific inquiry as warrantors of the validity of judgment." But, if
Bickel were to follow this second line of analysis, then he must convict
his "Justices of the Warren Court" of knowingly lacking in candor
and practicing intellectual deceit. This he refuses to do: "I portray
my philosophes neither as 'naive', nor as 'a little fraudulent' I'll Is
Justice Frankfurter then to be preferred over the "Justices of the
Warren Court" because he, and not they, perceived the true nature of
the judicial process, or because he, and not they, deferred to the
legislature? The validity of Bickel's criticism cannot be assessed
because he ultimately fails to show precisely the substantive content of
"the idea of progress," the nature of its force, its supporting evidence,
and exactly how the idea fits into his intellectual framework. Is it a
causative agent that caused the "Justices of the Warren Court" to act,
or, is it merely Bickel's interpretative device, superimposed upon the
opinions?
Also consider justice Frankfurters parallel view on the due process clause in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), where he states that due process
requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science,
on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of
conflicting claims, .. .on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of
reconciling the needs of continuity and of change in a progressive society....

Is this an article of faith? Justice Frankfurter concludes by holding that a violation of the due process clause occurs when police officers, without permission, force an
emetic solution into a citizen's stomach, forcing him to vomit up evidence. Justice Frankfurter says that this violates due process because it "is conduct that shocks the conscience."
Hardly a repeal or a procedural interpretation of the due process clause.
38. If the Court had not intervened in the reapportionment cases, but deferred, as
Bickel and Justice Frankfurter advocate, malapportioned legislatures would never have
been open to challenge by democratic processes that gave the majority power in accordance with its members. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter's position that the remedy for
dealing with malapportioned legislatures lay at the polls and not with the courts is nothing
other than a cynical evasion of the question; a refusal to invoke judicial review (in the
name of democracy?).

39. Bicx3mL at 14 n.*.
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III. THE WEB OF SUBJECTIVITY
Bickel opens this chapter by asserting that the "Warren Court" has
been subjected to "criticism for erratic subjectivity of judgment, for
analytical laxness, for what amounts to intellectual incoherence in
many opinions, and for imagining too much history."4 He concludes
that "[t]he charges against the Warren Court can be made out, irrefutably and amply.""' These are serious accusations, requiring convincing evidence, but Bickel seeks to "substantiate them, with [only]
some random samples, and . . . attempt[s] to categorize them, for

while they constitute a single web, the web of subjectivity, it is not a
seamless one."4
Space precludes dealing with each of Bickel's samples.43 Two of the
samples, carefully selected by Bickel to illustrate his charge that his
"Warren Court" afforded "instances of ad hoc subjectivity resulting
' are the cases of Edward Mishkin
in palpable injustice to individuals"44
and Ralph Ginzburg, decided on the same day. The reason I say
Bickel carefully culled his "random" samples is that Messrs. Mishkin
and Ginzburg were convicted on charges of obscenity, and with these
two exceptions, as Bickel himself acknowledges, "[i] n no decision after
1957 did the Court uphold a finding of obscenity."4 Moreover, Bickel
asserts that with respect to obscenity, "by 1966, a rule had emerged
' Thus, Bickel concludes that
whose effect, at least, was intelligible."46
because Mishkin and Ginzburg were convicted, their cases "are instances of ad hoc subjectivity [of his Warren Court] resulting in
palpable injustice to individuals.14 7 But in 1966, there was no single
rule of the Court on the test of obscenity. All the justices, including

40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id.
43. I do not deal with all of his criticisms of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (see Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WAsHr. L. REv. 1, 56-76 (1968));
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), or United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
44. BICEL at 50.

45. Id.
46. Id. I disagree with this statement because I do not believe that, in 1966, there was
"one rule" on obscenity, but that it was unintelligible; yet, its effects were "intelligible."
Actually, there were many different rules, and in many cases, but not all, they converged
leading to a single result.
47. Id.
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Bickel's "Justices of the Warren Court" were split as to what constituted the proper test of obscenity. 8
Bickel offers the result of the convictions of Messrs. Mishkin and
Ginzburg, rather than statement of principle, as "random samples" of
his Warren Court's "web of subjectivity." This result orientation is
odd for Bickel who as a critic believes attention shall be on principle
and analytical reason. The accuracy of his attribution of responsibility
must be judged by the actual vote of his "Justices of the Warren
Court." In both cases, 49 Mr Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the
Court for a majority of five, but it included only two more justices
from Bickel's "Warren Court"--the Chief and Justice Fortas. Bickel's
remaining two "Justices of the Warren Court"--Justices Black and
Douglas-dissented, presumably with Bickel's approval. Given this
vote, it is difficult to see how Bickel can locate any justification for his
indictment of his "Warren Court" that Mishkin and Ginzburg are
"instances of ad hoc subjectivity," although I agree that they resulted
in palpable injustice to individuals.
The second category advanced by Bickel to show "the web of
subjectivity" is named "the failure of [the judicial] process. '50 This
category contains "cases in which the Court stamps its foot, as it were,
and refuses to enter into argument on a, or the, decisive issue. The
Warren Court inaugurated this practice.., early in its career .... ,,51
Here Bickel focusses on statements of principle rather than results,
but falls to overcome the familiar hurdle of finding his "dominant
majority of the Warren Court." Bickel's "random samples" include
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections2 and South Carolina v. Katzenbachk. 3
48. See Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 7, 56-57;

and Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
49. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. United States, 383
U.S. 502 (1966).
50. BicnaL at 58.

51. Id.
52. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
In Harper,the Court said that "the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the.political theory of a particular era" and that "[niotions of what constitutes equal protection
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." Id. at 669. Given Bickel's earlier
statements about the virtues of candor and a conscious awareness of action, one would

expect him to commend rather than condemn Harper.Moreover, Mr. Justice Black dissents,
in part, on the ground that the Court "seems to be using the old 'natural-law-due-process
formula.'" Id. at 675. Instead of commending justice Black for agreeing with him Bickel

places him in his "Warren Court" and subjects him to criticism. This is especially improper
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Bickel offers Reitman v. Mulkey 4 to illustrate twin failures of the
judicial process in his "Warren Court"--a failure in principle and a
failure of judicial activism because the Court took Reitman under
its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. But, does Reitman evidence a
failure of principle?
In November, 1964, pursuant to initiative and referendum, California's voters adopted a constitutional amendment called Proposition 14,
which repealed all open housing legislation. 5 Bickel notes that, "[i]n
an obscure opinion, the California Supreme Court held Proposition 14
invalid as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."5 6 However, he ignores two other considerations
of California's Supreme Court that were relied upon for decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States: (1) "the [California] court
conceded that the State was permitted a neutral position with respect
to private racial discriminations and that the State was not bound by
the Federal Constitution to forbid them;" and (2) the California court
had put an authoritative gloss on Proposition 14 by holding that, construed against its background, Proposition 14 went beyond mere
neutrality; indeed the court held that Proposition 14 "changed the
situation from one in which [racial] discrimination was restricted 'to
one wherein it is encouraged' . . . [Proposition 14] was legislative
action 'which authorized private discrimination' and made the State
'at least a partner in the instant act of discrimination.... ' The [California] court could 'conceive of no other purpose for an application of
[Proposition 14] aside from authorizing the perpetration of a purported
private discrimination .... ) ,,57
in light of Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) and
subsequent history against justices building their faiths into the Constitution. See H.
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968), and ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FaFaom: MR.
JUSTICE BLACK AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (I. Dilliard ed. 1963).
53. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Bickel's criticism of this case does not go to the substance of the opinion, but to a
question of jurisdiction which was neither raised by Court or counsel, nor argued.
54. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to
Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28-38 (1968).
55. The proposition read:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person . . . to sell, lease or rent any part or all
of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
387 U.S. at 371.
56. BICKEL at 65.
57. 387 U.S. at 374-75.
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These holdings, adopted by the Warren Court, show that if Proposition 14 had said no more than: "The open housing statutes of this
State, namely statutes 1, 2, 3, 4, are hereby repealed," then Proposition
14 would have been constitutionally unassailable. Presumably, the
state would have been in a constitutionally neutral position regarding
private racial discrimination in housing. On the other hand, the Court
has long held that when a state statute, constitutional provision, or
common law rule is before it for review, and the state supreme court
has construed the provision, then United States Supreme Court review
cannot be restricted solely to the provision as written, but must also
be predicated on the provision's meaning and purpose as authoritatively
construed by the state court. 8 California's court held that Proposition
14 legislatively had authorized racial discrimination for the purposes
of encouraging and perpetuating private racial discrimination. Those
purposes were to be achieved by legislation, i.e., "state action," and the
position achieved was not one of state neutrality. The final judgment
of California's Supreme Court was that Proposition 14 "unconstitutionally involves the State in racial discriminations and is therefore
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment," and the Supreme Court
of the United States concurred saying, "[t]here is no sound reason for
rejecting this judgment."5 9 Thus, there was a "principle"; namely,
58. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
59. 387 U.S. at 376. The Court's opinion is reasonably clear on this point:
Petitioners contend that the California court has misconstrued the Fourteenth
Amendment since the repeal of any statute prohibiting racial discrimination, which is
constitutionally permissible, may be said to "authorize" and "encourage" discrimination
because it makes legally permissible that which was formerly proscribed. But, as we
understand the California court, it did not posit a constitutional violation on the mere
repeal of the Unruh and Rumford Acts. It did not read either our cases or the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing an automatic constitutional barrier to the repeal of
an existing law prohibiting racial discriminations in housing; nor did the court rule
that a State may never put in statutory form an existing policy of neutrality with
respect to private discriminations. What the court below did was first reject the notion
that the State was required to have a statute prohibiting racial discriminations in
housing. Second, it held the intent of § 26 [Proposition 14] was to authorize private
racial discriminations in the housing market, to repeal the Unruh and Rumford Acts
and to create a constitutional right to discriminate on racial grounds in the sale and
leasing of real property. Hence, the court dealt with § 26 as though it expressly
authorized and constitutionalized the private right to discriminate. Third, the court
assessed the ultimate impact of § 26 in the California environment and concluded that
the section would encourage and significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The California court could very reasonably conclude that § 26 would and did have
wider impact than a mere repeal of existing statutes. Section 26 mentioned neither the
Unruh nor Rumford Act in so many words. Instead, it announced the constitutional
right of any person to decline to sell or lease his real property to anyone to whom he
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that under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, no
state has power legislatively to authorize or to encourage racial discrimination in the selling, leasing or renting of real estate.
Bickel, on the other hand, holds that "the Court in [Reitman]
floundered,"'6 0 stating that after the Supreme Court "brought the case
up by granting certiorari,

. .

.it then shied away from deciding it on

the basis of an ultimate principle, namely, that with respect to housing,
. . . the state cannot be neutral, and the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition of discriminatory state action means that the state has an
affirmative duty to prevent, or seek to prevent, discrimination."' This
would have been a wise step for the Court to take; it might even
evidence faith in the idea of progress, but, as the Court realized, it was
not necessary. Not only was that decision an act of statesmanship in
terms of principled constitutional adjudication, but it was also an act
of statesmanship under the Court's certiorari jurisdiction.
Bickel cites Witherspoon v. Illinois6 2 written by Justice Stewart, a

non-member of Bickel's "Warren Court," as another "random sample"
of the "Warren Court's" failure of judicial process. Bickel's claims here
are that Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court was "beguiled by an
did not desire to sell or lease. Unruh and Rumford were thereby pro tanto repealed.
But the section struck more deeply and more widely. Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from Rumford and Unruh but they also enjoyed a far
different status than was true before the passage of those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in
the State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at
any level of the state government. Those practicing racial discriminations need no
longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure or interference of any kind from official sources.
All individuals, partnerships, corporations and other legal entities, as well as their
agents and representatives, could now discriminate with respect to their residential
real property, which is defined as any interest in real property of any kind or quality,
"irrespective of how obtained or financed," and seemingly irrespective of the relationship of the State to such interests in real property. Only the State is excluded with
respect to property owned by it.
Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does
authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right to discriminate is now
one of the basic policies of the State. The California Supreme Court believes that the
section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations.
We have been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.
Affirmed.
Id. at 376-77, 380-81
60. BICKEL at 69.
61. Id. at 65-66.
62. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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insufficient analysis,"' 6 and failed to meet "a crucial point made by
Mr. Justice White ... in dissent.""6' Justices Black and Harlan also
dissented; Justice Douglas concurred. Justice White's "point" was
that:"5
The Court does not deny that the legislature can impose a
particular penalty, including death, on all persons convicted of
certain crimes. Why, then, should it be disabled from delegating
the penalty decision to a group who will impose the death penalty
more often than would a group differently chosen?
Illinois' jury-selection rules not only excused from that jury veniremen
who stated they could not, in conscience, vote for the death penalty,
but also the veniremen who, in varying degrees of commitment, stated
that they opposed the death penalty, without considering whether the
veniremen could put aside their views and function impartially on the
jury. Bickel does not comment on the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas, a member of his "Warren Court." It meets the "point"
made by Justice White by directly setting forth the meaning of the term
(jury":YO
"There is no constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group
of uneducated and unintelligent persons. Nor is there any right to
a jury chosen solely from those at the lower end of the economic
and social scale. But there is a constitutional right to a jury drawn
from a group which represents a cross-section of the community.
And a cross-section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with varying economic
and social positions. Under our Constitution, the jury is not to be
made the representative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy
or the most successful, nor of the least intelligent, the least wealthy
or the least successful. It is a democratic institution, representative
of all qualified classes of people." [Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261,299-300 (1946) (dissenting opinion)].
The idea that a jury should be "impartially drawn from a crosssection of the community" certainly should not mean a selection of
only those with a predisposition to impose the severest sentence
or with a predisposition to impose the least one that is possible.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Bicxzi at 71.
Id. at 73.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 541 (1968).
Id. at 524-25.
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This statement illustrates the criteria that Mr. Justice White's "group"
must meet before it can be considered a "jury." Underlying this view
is the notion that a state must be impartial and neutral when producing
a "jury." This consideration was also noted by Justice Stewart in his
opinion of the Court: "But when [the State] swept from the jury all
who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of
neutrality. ... [T]he State produced a jury uncommonly willing to
condemn a man to die."16 7 Given this discussion, it is difficult for Bickel
to contend that Witherspoon is an example of the failure of the judicial
process because "Justice White's small, still voice of reason remained,
' 68
thus, unstilled and unanswered.
In short, Bickel does not state satisfactorily what, precisely, constitutes a "principled basis" justifying judicial intervention. Moreover,
I believe Bickel's "random samples" fail and do not "irrefutably and
amply" substantiate his charges against his "Warren Court." They
remain just that-charges-and his case against his "Justices of the
Warren Court" remains unproven.
IV.

REMEMBERING THE FUTURE

Bickel's final chapter is a remarkably creative seventy-eight page
tour de force in which he presents a gloomy "scenario of the future...
that [he believes is] implicit in the work of the Warren Court .... 69
He foresees a collision between the desegregation cases and the reapportionment decisions, believing that in these cases his "Warren Court"
unwisely opted for unification and nationalization at a time when
American society is caught in a dissonance between these forces and
movement toward decentralization and diversity. Bickel thinks his
"Warren Court" failed to serve the interests of the future, and would
have done better if, like Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it had deferred and
made no choices at all. But he goes further, and without presenting
adequate supporting evidence, opts for the view that, in the end, the
forces of decentralization and diversity will win out. The startling

67. Id. at 520-21.
68. BICKEL at 75.
69. Id. at 100.
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conclusion of Bickel's prognosis is "that the Warren Court's noblest
enterprise-school desegregation-and its most popular enterprisereapportionment-not to speak of school-prayer cases and those concerning aid to parochial schools, are heading toward obsolescence, and
in large measure abandonment." 7
For Bickel, public school organization is at the crossroads. It can
either become centralized (bad) or decentralized (good). Centralization "is indeed the destination toward which the egalitarian and assimilationist presuppositions of judicial decisions are propelling the constitutional law of public schools. 71 The basic force behind this
movement is, of course, Brown v. Board of Educ. and its progeny, all
of which Bickel attributes to his "Warren Court."
At minimum, Brown clearly holds that public school segregation
enforced by law is unconstitutional. This proposition speaks only to
de jure segregation, not de facto segregation. Bickel believes Brown
should be restricted to its limited, de jure proposition, and not applied to
de facto segregation. But, as Bickel notes in his scenario, there is
provocative language in Brown, appearing immediately before the
72
Court's holding:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect on the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
The Court continued, stating that "this finding is amply supported by
modern authority," and it then "conclude [d] that in the field of public
70. Id. at 173. Later Bickel characterizes the desegregation decisions as instances of the
Court pushing "its patent medicines so far so fast." Id. at 179.
71. Id. at 138.
72.

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), quoting a finding by the

lower Kansas court. One page earlier the Court discusses the intangible considerations that
go into an education, one of them being the opportunity for students "'to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn... ;'" all
of which "apply with added force to children in grade and high schools" because "[t]o

separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to he undone." Id. at 493-94.
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education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."73 The Court has admitted
that although the impact of segregation "is greater when it has the sanction of law," it nonetheless still "has a detrimental effect on the colored
children" whenever it is de facto. Thus, since racially "separate educational facilities provided by the state are inherently unequal" they may
be held to violate the equal protection clause.
This view, Bickel believes, takes on great importance in light of the
Court's holding in Green v. County School Board,7 4 which, for all practical purposes, eliminated freedom of choice plans in the South by
holding that where schools were once segregated by law, and freedom
of choice plans failed to produce integrated schools, then " '[t]he school
officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action may be
necessary to create a "unitary nonracial system".' ,,
1 If Brown applies
to de facto segregation, then there is no reason to believe that the duty
of Green would not equally apply.
This possibility haunts Bickel for several reasons. First, it must
70
bring on a dramatic centralization of control over the public schools
because in most of the larger urban areas demographic conditions are
such that a unit the size of a metropolitan area, or perhaps even a
county or several small counties, rather than a mere school district or

73. Id. at 494-95. At 493, the Court said:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
74. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
75. 391 U.S. at 440, quoting Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th
Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring). Bickel seems to misunderstand this case stating that
"The Court's holding was tied to evidence of foot dragging and bad faith on the part of
the school board." BICKEL at 128. Actually the Court was concerned only with consequences, not foot-dragging or bad faith:
Freedom of choice is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally
required end-the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. If the means
prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be
used to achieve this end.
391 U.S. at 440, quoting Bowman, supra.
76. BICKEL at 135.
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even a city, is required before racial balance can be achieved in public
schools. Bickel does not believe the price of centralizing one, or a few,
school functions is worth paying because he favors local control. But
even if this price is paid, a second concern prompts Bickel to doubt
"whether significant integration can be achieved even under centralized
control."77 He believes integration will not be achieved because whites
who stay within the range of school integration orders will escape them
by fleeing to private schools, parochial or otherwise 7 S while other
whites will escape them by moving farther away, out of range of
integration orders. Bickel also fears an unequal application of national
law. If freedom of choice plans are denied to the South, but residential
segregation and other available options are allowed to produce de facto
segregation in the North and West, then there will be an unequal application of national law. Finally, Bickel's gloomiest prediction is that
compulsory integration of the poor whites and blacks who remain in
urban areas will result in socio-economic discrimination and a greater
lack of educational attainment for poor black and white children. 79
"The upshot, then, of judicial action against de facto segregation
would be that an integrated education, if any, is willy-nilly for the
poor, but a matter of choice for the well-to-do, even as now centrally
and remotely administered schools are for the poor, but the well-to-do
community can control its own schools."8 "
77. Id. at 136.
78. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284 (1927).
79. The point is, however, that given the current sodo-economic status of blacks, an
honestly integrated school will be one that also contains heterogenous soco-economic
classes, and the evidence we have indicates that such a mix is conducive to better learning
experiences. See J. CorEA,
EQuALrrY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), and
Bowler & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement, 3 J. H- MAN RESOURCES
No. 1 (1968). Consider also the report by Herbert Kohl who states that his students, who
were poor and black, were able within a few months to raise their reading scores from one
to three years by simply learning how to take examinations, something middle-class children learn early. H. KoUL, 36 C m.DRN 178 (1967). If a school is "integrated" there remains the problem of tracking, frequently called ability grouping of children. Although
approved by J. CONANT, SumsS AND SUBURBS (1961), the most extensive study of ability
grouping students in public schools concludes "that ability grouping, per se, produces no
improvement in achievement for any ability level and, as an administrative device, has
little merit." M. GOLDBERG, A. PASSOW, & J. JUSTMAN, THE EFFEcTs OF ABirY GaoUPIm
163 (1966); see also Justman, Ability Grouping-What Good Is It?, Tnx URBAN RaV.,
Feb. 1967, at 2 and R. RosiN~naL, PYGMALION n HE CrASSROOM (1968). Tracking, of

course, reintroduces segregation. See Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
and U.S. Comms. ON Civm RIGHTs, RACIAL IsoLATioN IN THE PUBLIC Scnoor.s (1967).

80. Bic=xL at 137. What Bickel assumes here is lack of political commitment to
desegregation and he ignores the idea that a sodo-economic mix of students tends toward
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Bickel closes his scenario by springing the trap of one-man, onevote on an unsuspecting and integrating public school system."' Public
school organization, Bickel believes, can either centralize or decentralize. He holds that the reapportionment decisions contain majoritarian
premises and, in the context of a centralizing school system, they will
deny power and flexibility to minorities. Blacks necessarily will lose
out. Centralization pursuant to Brown means regional or larger school
units. In Bickel's view, this development must necessarily result in
either disregard of local control over schools or abandonment of the
majoritarian principle inherent in the one-man, one vote cases. Neither
situation is, according to Bickel, a pleasant consequence for his "Warren
Court" and its "idea of progress." On the other hand, if school organization moves toward decentralization and local control, it again collides
with the reapportionment cases because their rule requiring equal
districts cannot be satisfied. Thus, Bickel argues, developing political
reality is at loggerheads with the constitutional law created by his
"Warren Court" as inspired by its idea of progress.
Accordingly, Bickel recommends that the Court should abandon
Green and limit Brown strictly to de jure segregation. For him, this
is a curious stance. He appears to want the Court to rely on current
social reality for interpreting the Constitution-white suburbanites
fleeing the city, class discrimination, the failure of Congress and the
President fully to accept the goal of an integrated society-and to
accommodate these factors. But throughout his book he criticizes his
"Warren Court" for lacking soundly reasoned principled judgment and
allowing itself to get involved in exactly the type of social engineering
Bickel is now recommending.
Moreover, Bickel's projected scenario, which he says is implicit in
Brown, is a straw man because he ignores the fourteenth amendment
better education. Given the poor socio-economic position of most blacks, if the whites are
average or a little below, there would still be a net gain.
81. Space considerations preclude a lengthy discussion of his interpretations of the reapportionment cases and their consequences. Suffice it to say that in his plea for the
abandonment of the implications of those decisions, and a substitution of a Madisonian
theory of pluralism, resting on checks and balances, Bickel never confronts the implications
for his recommendation of the existence of large scale organizations, especially big business
and big labor. One doubts whether, in today's world, there exists the number of groups
and factions having relatively equal power and balance which are necessary to make the
Madisonian theory work.
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and its requirement of state action. Before the self-executing provisions
of that amendment can apply to de facto segregation, and the Brown
and Green cases control, there must first be state action. Thus, there
is, at present, a jurisdictional line found in the fourteenth amendment
between de jure and de facto segregation which Bickel fails to consider.
After abandoning the implications of Brown and the reapportionment
cases, Bickel advocates a tuition-grant system as a constitutional
alternative. Following Professor Milton Friedman,12 he proposes that
states and perhaps the national government should provide funds for
children who will use them to select the school of their choice---private,
parochial or otherwise, or public. Bickel would subject private schools
to the minimum de jure reading of Brown so that no school receiving
public money could have a racially restrictive rule of admission, but by
taking only the minimum step he coolly recognizes that "assuredly many
private schools, as also many decentralized public schools, would be
de facto segregated, or nearly so."" Thus, Bickel's proposal would not
eliminate segregated schools, but would eliminate, for all practical
purposes, the assimilationist mission from education. Bickel never
adequately defends his assertion that his scheme would provide higher
quality education for the poor whites and the poor and unassimilated
blacks. Without meaning to be ironic, Bickel asserts that his tuitiongrant scheme "can, at minimum, be as egalitarian as the progressive
income tax."' 8 4 Bickel's conclusion is that if his proposals are adopted
Brown v. Board of Educ. "may be headed for-dread word-irrelevance." 85 Indeed, it would, but also so would our public schools which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter correctly described as having been "[d] esigned
to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion
among a heterogeneous democratic people." 8" The American public
school, Justice Frankfurter said, "is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common des7
tiny.,,S

82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

M. FRmEDmA , CArAISm AND FRom 89-107 (1962).
BIcxZL at 150.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 151.
McCallum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948).
Id. at 231.
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CONCLUSION
Bickel fails to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that his charges
against his "Warren Court" are true. His book contains many unsupported generalizations and evidence that is highly selective and
sometimes analytically inconsistent. Nevertheless, fairly or unfairly,
his book will become part of the shifting battle over integration. Bickel
is a genuinely humane man who desires fair and equal treatment for
blacks and does not want his book used against black Americans. But it
will be a handy brick in the next fight. It will be relied upon as documentary proof that his "Warren Court" is properly to be criticized
"for erratic subjectivity of judgment, for analytical laxness, for what
amounts to intellectual incoherence in many opinions, and for imagining
too much history."'8 It will be cited as authority for the view that the
school-prayer, desegregation and reapportionment decisions were wrong.
The Warren Court took the Civil War, and the Civil War Amendments, seriously. It is well known that in the 1870's and 80's, after
Congress had abandoned its efforts to reconstruct the South, the Supreme Court rendered a series of decisions subjecting the Civil War
Amendments to their narrowest interpretations. By holding the bulk
of the reconstruction legislation unconstitutional, the Court confirmed
the indifference of white America to the future of blacks.89 The
calamity of the Civil War and the period of Reconstruction was the
national decision, legitimated by the Supreme Court, to turn its back
on the plight of the freedmen, leaving them to their fate at the hands of
racist Southern governments. The Warren Court revived the Reconstruction efforts by courageously facing this dark side of our history;
it may have made mistakes, but it tried to produce one class of American
citizens, not two-one white and one black. The Warren Court was a
source of inspiration for many Americans; it revived American ideals;
it functioned as a conscience for our racist society, and it restored
faith in America. But, Bickel ignores the Warren Court's humanism
and its historical context. He repeatedly refers to it as being "'engaged

88.

BICKEL at 45.
See, e.g., A. KELLY & W. H1AiwIsoN, THE Aimmx
CoNsmuTiox: ITS ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT 450-520 (1955).
90. See, e.g., J. KOVEL, W:ITE RAcIsm: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970), and W. JoRamZ,
WHITE OVER BLACK (1968).

89.
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in that nefarious medieval enterprise of reconciling the facts of human
experience with truths already, in some fashion, revealed to them.' "91
Medieval enterprise? As Leon E. Panetta wrote when he commented
on this shortcoming of Bickel's book, "the greatest weakness of the
book lies not in its analytical inconsistencies or its philosophic overgeneralizations, but in its failure to remember or perhaps understand
the Renaissance and its impact upon history. The author ignores the
humanism of a court which saw the rights of people-to be free, to be
equal-and fails to recognize that humanism is the essence of political
democracy and thus the substance of judicial statesmanship."'9 2
91. Bicnmr at 21. "'The function of intelligence' in the medieval world, wrote Carl
Becker, was 'to demonstrate the truth of revealed knowledge, to reconcile diverse and
pragmatic experience with the rational pattern of the world as given in faith."' Bczm
at 18.

92. Panetta, What Happened To The Renaissance? 5 HAxv. Cxv. RTs.-Cv. LIm. L.
REv. 516, 521 (1970).
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